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TRUST RECEIPTS
PHILIP W. THAYER
A note published in 19271 expressed the hope that the course of
legal development in the state of Washington would result in recogni-
tion of the trust receipt as "an' instrument sui generis, perfectly effec-
tive within its limits."'2 Recent doubts as to the fulfilment of this hope
make it desirable to examine the question more closely. The purpose
of the present paper therefore is to inquire into the function of the
trust receipt as an instrument of the law merchant, and to determine
if possible how that function may be most satisfactorily exercised under
existing conditions.
Trust receipts appear to have been first used in connection with
the financing of imports.3 The main objective was to preserve a measure
of security to the financing bank even after delivery to the importer
of the goods imported. In a typical transaction the foreign seller shipped
goods under a letter of credit and drew a draft on the issuing bank.
This draft was accompanied by a shipper's order bill of lading appro-
priately indorsed either in blank or to the order of the bank. On
honoring the draft, usually by acceptance, the bank acquired posses-
sion of the bill of lading. Between the time of acceptance and the date
of maturity a period intervened, often ninety days, during which in
the ordinary course the importer could not get the documents, and
through them the goods, without reimbursing the bank under the
terms of the agreement by which the letter of credit had been estab-
lished. If it chose to do so,. however, the bank might release the docu-
12 WASH. L. Ray. 125.
2Id. at 128.
aThe first case in which the expression "trust receipt" is found seems
to be Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59 (1877). Other early cases are Farmers
and Mechanics' National Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878); Moors v.
Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32 (1887); New Haven Wire Company Cases, 57 Conn.
352, 18 Atl. 266 (1888); and Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 129, 30 N. E. 732
(1892).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ments to the importer without reimbursement, and it became common
practice to surrender documents in this way against the signing of a
trust receipt. By the terms of this receipt the importer acknowledged
the title of the bank to the goods, and undertook to hold them or their
proceeds for the bank's account, admitting in the meantime the right of
the bank to cancel the receipt at any time and to resume possession
of goods or proceeds.4
Salient features of the trust receipt transaction as thus outlined
stand out sharply. In the first place, it is noteworthy that the security
title to the goods passes to the bank from the seller and not from
the buyer; the latter indeed never acquires any such title until the
trust receipt has been retired. There is thus a clear distinction between
a trust receipt transaction and either a chattel mortgage or a condi-
tional sale, for in the case of a chattel mortgage the security title is
given by the borrower to the lender, while in a conditional sale the
security title to the goods is retained by the seller. In the second place,
it is to be remarked that the obligation to account for the goods or
for their proceeds connotes the power to sell the goods, or even to
merge them with other goods and to change their identity in process
of manufacture. The reason for this power is obvious: the financing
bank is not in the merchandising business, and its interest in the goods
is purely as security for a loan. The buyer is the person best sifuated
to realize on the goods for the joint advantage of both. In the third
place, the power to sell necessarily must carry with it the ability to
convey a good title to bona fide purchasers. It follows that the use of
the trust receipt cannot be intended to protect the bank against dis-
honesty by the buyer in disposing of the goods to such purchasers, but
must be designed primarily to afford protection against creditors of
the buyer in the event of his insolvency.
In the final result therefore the trust receipt transaction as originally
devised was one in which the bank financing a purchase of goods ac-
quired a security interest in the goods from the seller and retained
it for certain purposes until the buyer's indebtedness was extinguished.
From the point of view of the buyer the transaction meant a continua-
tion of credit extension to include the period of possession and resale.
The transaction was thus self-liquidating in that the proceeds of the
goods furnished the means of wiping out the obligation. The com-
mercial desirability of this means of financing incoming stock was gen-
'More detailed accounts of typical trust receipt transactions may be
found in the following articles: Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security
(1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395, 546; Hanna, Trust Receipts (1929) 29 COL. L. REV.
545; Vold, Trust Receipt Security in the Financing of Sales (1930) 15
CoRN. L. Q. 543; Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transcation (1936) 5 FoDHAsm
L. R v. 17.
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erally admitted, and did not pass unremarked by the courts. In Century
Throwing Co. v. Muller,5 the court said:
"We can readily understand how the business of foreign im-
portation by merchants, and especially by manufacturers, is
facilitated and enlarged by making available to those of small
means the credit of banking capital. The business of impor-
tation is thus extended, by not being confined to those con-
cerns having large capital and established foreign trade. The
exigencies of trade and commerce have caused many ex-
ceptions to be made to the rigid rule founded on the policy
underlying the statute of frauds, by -which the divorce of
title from possession is declared either evidence of fraud or
to be fraudulent per se."8
That the effect of the trust receipt transaction was to create a secret.
lien in favor of the financing bank was not regarded as a matter of im-
portance in the mercantile world, for "creditors of persons in the busi-
ness of importing are aware of the course of business and of the exist-
ence of the banks' liens even when the liens are secret."7 Any record-
ing of trust receipts was therefore deemed to be unnecessary, particu-
larly as the great majority of transactions were of a short time nature.8
Within the framework described courts tended, on one ground or
another, to uphold the efficacy of trust receipts in line with commer-
cial understanding. Here and there a trust receipt transaction was held
to be a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale,10 and hence to come
within the provisions of the recording acts. In general, however, courts
were "astute to protect the rights of the banker"" in the event of the
importer's insolvency, for "it would be most inequitable that the bank-
rupt or his trustees should escape from the performance of this obliga-
1197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d. 1912).
6 Id. at 258.
? Handbook of the National' Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1927) 609.
'The goods covered by trust receipt were bought for resale, not as
fixtures or equipment in the buyer's establishment, nor for his permanent
use. The time during which financing facilities were required was, there-
fore, limited to the period needed to accomplish the resale, often only a
matter of days.
' Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction, supra, note 4, says at page 39:
"Were it not for the fact that by mortgage law a chattel mortgagee is
defeated, as against innocent purchasers, pledgees, or creditors of the
mortgagor, unless he assumes possession or files a record, the writer
believes that the trust receipt transaction would have been declared to
be a chattel mortgage long ago, although he does not believe that it
necessarily is one. In other words, the courts have resorted to some
astuteness to avoid declaring the transaction to be a mortgage. A few
of the case opinions admit that it is 'very like' or 'in the nature' of a
mortgage." 1 WLufSTON, SALEs (1924) 654, and Frederick, The Trust Re-
ceipt as Security, supra, note 4, take the viev that a trust receipt is, in
substance, a chattel mortgage. It is noteworthy, however, that both state
that it is not an ordinary chattel mortgage.
"ONew Haven Wire Company Cases, supra, note 3; In re Bettmann-
Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Maxwell Motor Sales Co.
v. Bankers' Mortgage & Securities Co., 195 Ia. 384, 192 N. W. 19 (1923).
"In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) at 735.
1941]
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tion for the benefit of anyone except a bona fide purchaser for value or
creditors protected by statute.' ' 2 Numerous decisions affirmed the
right of the financing bank to the goods"3 or to their proceeds 4 as
against general creditors of the importer. On the other hand, purchasers
from the importer in good faith and for value were allowed to prevail
over the bank.15
Trust receipts, however, did not continue to be restricted to import-
ing. Their equal adaptability to purely domestic transactions was mani-
fest, and received the blessing of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in a case where the general set-up was similar to that
already described.' Said the court:
"It has been recognized that there are sound business rea-
sons why it is unnecessary to record trust receipts, and also
that they should have superior protection as compared with
an unrecorded chattel mortgage, when they are given to a
lender of money by some one other than the debtor, and
where either the delivery or possession against trust receipts
is made to the debtor." 7
The introduction of trust receipts into the domestic field was never-
theless not without complicating features. In many instances the fi-
nancing arrangements in use were not the same as those encountered
in importing,"6 and in others the situation involved only two parties
without the intervention of a third.' 9 Zealous lawyers also contributed
to the confusion often hedging the domestic trust receipt transaction
about with so many elaborate safeguards in the interests of their clients
that its real nature was left open to doubt. In at least one case such
1Ibid.
13 See for example In re Cattus, supra, note 11; Century Throwing Co.
v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912); In re Killian Manufacturing Co.,
215 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914); In re K. Marks & Co., 222 Fed. 52 (C. C. A.
2d, 1915); In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (D. C. Del. 1924);
Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (1894).
,See for example In re K. Marks & Co., supra, note 13; In re Ford-
Rennie Leather Co., supra, note 13; In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 Fed.
245 (D. C. N. J., 1908); Mershon v. Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 95 (1890).
1See for example Blydenstein v. New York Security & Trust Co., 67
Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895); Commercial National Bank v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co., 239 U. S. 520 (1916); Baker Company v. Brown, 214
Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913).
16In re James, Inc, 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
17 Id. at 558.
"In the ordinary importing transactions the financing was handled
by banks. The development of acceptance and credit corporations and
of other types of financing companies introduced new factors into domestic
transactions, operating in different ways.
"See for example American & British Securities Co. v. American &
British Manufacturing Corporation, 275 Fed. 121 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Com-
merce Guardian Trust & Savings Bank v. Devlin, 6 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A.
6th, 1925); Keystone Finance Corporation v. Krueger, 17 F. (2d) 904
(C. C. A. 3d, 1927); In re Sachs, 30 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Com-
monwealth Financing Corporation v. Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225, 116 Atl. 722
(1922); New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, 45 R. I. 225,
121 Atl. 398 (1923).
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ingenuity was its own undoing, for although the physical background
was essentially the same as in In re James, Inc.,20 the bank was not
allowed to prevail against a trustee in bankruptcy.21 "It will be ob-
served," remarked a commentator, "that if the bank,had required less
as in In re James, Inc., rather than more, it would presumably have
been successful.
-2 2
In summarizing the situation in 1933, the prefatory note to the final
draft of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 22 stated that:
"the majority of the cases in which the validity of the unre-
corded security-interest was tested, up to 1929, held the fi-
nancing agency's interest valid as against the dealer's creditors
or his trustee in bankruptcy, but invalid as against a bona
fide purchaser from the dealer in regular course of trade.
Since 1930, the decisions have tended definitely to deny valid-
ity as against creditors. The courts show strong objection to
the secrecy of the financing agency's interest. As a result
we have as hopeless and divided a set of authorities as one
can expect to find." 2
The clear cut outlines of the import trust receipt transaction had be-
come blurred. Ambiguous situations were created, and whatever might
be said commercially as to trust receipt policy in connection with them,
it at least was apparent that the use of the instrument could not be
supported by the same technical reasoning formerly employed.
25
With matters in this pass the first case concerning a trust receipt
came before the Supreme Court of Washington. 26 The transaction in-
volved was domestic, and the dispute was the familiar one between
receiver and finance company in regard to cars that had been in the
stock of an insolvent dealer. The cars were shipped by the manufac-
turer under bills of lading naming the shipper both as consignor and
consignee, with instructions to notify the dealer. The finance company
meanwhile had opened a credit covering the shipment, and drafts, to
which were attached bills of sale, were drawn on it by the manufacturer
for the amount of the price. On payment of these drafts the bills of
sale and bills of lading were delivered to the finance company, which
20 Supra, note 16.
2
' Jordan v. Federal Trust Co., 296 Fed. 738 (D. Mass., 1924).
2" Hanna, Trust Receipts, supra, note 4, at p. 548.
23 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1933) 246.
21 Ibid
25 In two party transactions, for instance, it was impossible to argue
that the financing agent was retaining a security -interest acquired from
the seller. The situation usually was such that courts construed the
transaction as a chattel mortgage, as in the cases cited in note 19, although
sometimes the circumstances pointed rather to a conditional sale: In re
Shiffert, 281 Fed. 284 (E. D. Penn., 1922); In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co.,
supra, note 13; Maxwell Motor Sales Corp. v. Banker's Mortgage & Se-
curities Co., supra, note 13.




thereupon turned the cars over to the dealer in exchange for a trust
receipt." Subsequently the dealer became insolvent, and the cars were
repossessed by the finance company. The receiver brought an action
against the finance company for conversion. A judgment for defend-
ant was affirmed, Mitchell, J., saying:
"The argument is that the transactions were contrary to the
recording statutes and the decisions of this state against secret
liens in chattel property. However, as we understand, ap-
pellant . . . assumes that it was intended, and that the legal
effect of the transactions here was, that the [dealer] got
title to the automobiles, and by its trust receipts gave the
[finance company] security for the purchase price. The as-
sumption goes too far, in our opinion . . . Certainly, the cars
were not shipped to the [dealer]; they were shipped by the
owner to itself, accompanied by bills of sale to the [finance
company] upon it paying drafts for the value of the car.
If the total transaction in each case, by which the original
27 This instrument read as follows: "Received from . . . Commercial
Credit Company. . . the following described motor vehicles, complete with
all standard catalogue attachments and equipment as a component part
thereof, herein called 'Cars,' shipped or delivered to Undersigned under
credit opened by Commercial Credit for account of Undersigned . . [Six
automobiles, describing them]. In consideration thereof, Undersigned
agrees to hold said cars in trust for Commercial Credit as its property,
and to return all or any of said cars to Commercial Credit upon demand;
Commercial Credit at any time may examine said cars and the books
or records of Undersigned with reference thereto. Commercial Credit
may at any time cancel this trust and may take possession of said cars
without notice or demand, and for such purpose it or its representatives
may enter any premises at any time without legal process. Undersigned
shall not lend, rent, mortgage, pledge, encumber, operate, use or demon-
strate said cars, but may drive them from the place where delivery or
custody is taken hereunder direct to Undersigned's place of storage
where Undersigned shall keep the same properly housed without expense
or liability to Commercial Credit. Undersigned does indemnify and hold
harmless Commercial Credit from damages or liabilities of any nature,
if any, while Undersigned is so driving said cars to said place of storage.
Undersigned, before the termination of this trust, may sell said cars for
cash for not less than the sum or sums mentioned in the 'Wholesale-
storage' record of such cars, given by Commercial Credit to Undersigned,
and immediately after such sale Undersigned shall deliver the proceeds
thereof to Commercial Credit, and until delivery shall hold said proceeds
in trust for Commercial Credit separate from the funds of Undersigned.
The acceptance of a time draft by Undersigned or the negotiation of same
and the assignment of this trust receipt shall not affect or terminate this
trust, the intention being to preserve unimpaired the title and rights of
Commercial Credit in and to said cars. If Undersigned fails to sell said
cars or to pay said time draft or breaches this trust receipt, then Com-
mercial Credit may retain any sums paid by Undersigned as a consid-
eration for the privilege of displaying said cars and offering the same
for sale. Commercial Credit shall insure said cars against the hazards
of fire and theft while held by Undersigned hereunder for not less than
the wholesale price thereof, f. o. b. factory. Undersigned shall pay all
costs and expenses, including attorney's reasonable fees, if permitted
by law, that Commercial Credit may incur or pay to protect or enforce
its rights hereunder, whether by legal proceedings or otherwise. This
trust receipt shall bind and inure to the benefit of the successors and
assigns of Commercial Credit and Undersigned."
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vendors shipped the cars to Yakima, was originated by the
efforts of the [finance company], nevertheless there is no
evidence of any understanding, other than that carried out,
as expressed in the written instruments themselves, to the
effect that the [finance company] would buy and pay for the
automobiles and deliver them into the possession of the
[dealer] upon the terms set out in the trust receipts.' By the
trust receipts, the [dealer] admits that the automobiles be-
longed to the [finance company], which company had the
right to take possession of the automobiles at any time it
saw fit. In the trust receipts no promisd is made to pay
anything whatever for the automobiles, unless and until they
were sold by the [dealer]. Trust receipts are in no way de-
fined in the statute, and are to be interpreted according to
the rules applicable to written instruments generally.1 28
Two years later an instrument designated as a trust receipt fig-
ured in a case before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the -Ninth
Circuit. 29 Once again the struggle was between the receiver and the
finance company, and the action, as before, was brought by the former
for conversion. In most respects the background was similar to that in
Ivy v. Commercial Credit Compan-yY° At least two differences, how-
ever, were to be noted. In the first place, the dealer executed promissory
notes for the value of the cars in favor of the finance company; and in
the second place, the trust receipt itself contained a provision that the
dealer was not to sell the cars until the amounts due were paid. In
reversing a judgment for the plaintiff receiver, the court ignored this
latter provision, dismissed the first point as immaterial, cited Ivy v.
Commercial Credit Company,8 L and concluded "that under the law
of the state of Washington the automobiles in question belonged to the
appellant, and that it is not liable for conversion thereof.
3 2
After a lapse of two more years another case involving the same
general situation was heard by the Supreme Court of Washington.8 '
This time the action was brought in replevin by the finance company
to recover cars in the possession of the assignee of the dealer for the
benefit of the general creditors. As in General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration v. Kline, 4 the dealer had signed promissory notes in favor
of the finance company, and the trust receipt was in a similar form.35
28 Ivy v. Commercial Credit Company supra, note 26, pp. 364-366.29General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618
(C. C. A. 9th, 1935).3 0 Supra, note 26.
3 5 Supra, note 26.32 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Kline, supra, note 29,
at p. 622.33General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Seattle Association of
Credit Men, 190 Wash. 284, 67 P. (2d) 882 (1937).8t Supra, note 29.
"The instrument read as follows: "Received of General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation the motor vehicles described above. I (we) hereby
1941)
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The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment. Speaking for the court, Main, J., said:
"In determining the meaning and intent of the parties,
courts look beyond the form and from the evidence deter-
mine what the real transaction was. Secret liens whereby rights
are acquired or attempted to be acquired or retained at the
expense of general creditors are not favored in the law. Upon
the question of whether the trust receipt is superior to the
rights of general creditors, under facts like, or substantially
like, those presented in this case, the authorities are not in
harmony . . . It is not necessary here to determine whether
the correct view is that of a chattel mortgage or a conditional
sale, because, if either, under the recording laws of this state,
the trust receipt not being recorded or filed for record, the
rights of general creditors are superior to the rights of one
claiming under the trust receipt. There are a number of Fed-
eral circuit court cases, as well as two or three Federal district
court cases, which hold, unequivocally, that the trust receipt
protects the right of the holder, even though the recording
laws are not complied with . . . So far as we are informed
no state court of last resort, under facts which are compara-
ble to those which are presented in this case, has sustained
the right of the holder of the trust receipt as being superior
to that of the general creditors or subsequent purchasers of an
insolvent debtor . . . One of the principal tests by which to
determine whether a document or transaction results in a se-
curity, or there is retention of ownership, is a binding promise
to pay on the part of the dealer . . . After reading and con-
sidering the authorities representing the different views, we
conclude that the [finance company], in this case, held the
trust receipt as security . . . We now come to the case of Ivy
acknowledge that said motor vehicles are the property of said General
Motors Acceptance Corporation and agree to take and hold the same, at
my (our) sole risk as to all loss or injury, for the purpose of storing said
property; and I (we) hereby agree to keep said motor vehicles brand
new and not to operate them for demonstrating or otherwise, except as
may be necessary to drive said motor vehicles from freight depot or
from above city to my (our) place of business, with all due care, at
my (our) risk en route against all loss and damage to said motor vehicles,
persons or property, and except as I (we) may be allowed by you in
a special case to use the same for demonstrating upon our compliance
with the conditions expressed in your instructions to us, and to return
said motor vehicles to said General Motors Acceptance Corporation or
its order upon demand at any time and for any reason; and pay and dis-
charge all taxes, encumbrances and claims relative thereto. I (we)
hereby agree not to sell, loan, deliver, pledge, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of said motor vehicles to any other person until after payment
of amounts shown on dealer's record of purchase and release of like
identification number herewith. I (we) further agree that the deposit
made by me (us), in connection with this transaction, may be applied
for reimbursement for any expense and/or loss incurred by General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, in the event of breach of this trust or
repossession of said motor vehicles. It is further agreed that no one
has authority to vary the terms of this trust receipt."
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v. Commercial Credit Company, upon which much reliance
has been placed by the respondent. That case came here upon
the findings of fact alone. No evidence was brought to this
court. There was nothing in the record, as brought here, from
which the court could look through the form as it appeared
in the trust receipt, and determine from the evidence the exact
nature of the transaction. There was in that case no finding
(a) that the cars were ordered by the dealer direct from the
manufacturer; (b) that the dealer made any down payment;
or (c) that a negotiable promissory note was given for the
balance due. We do not regard the decision in that case
as controlling. Here, in effect, to recapitulate, the dealer
made a down payment of ten per cent which went directly
to the manufacturer. It gave a negotiable promissory* note for
the balance due. By authority of the [finance company], it
placed the automobiles on its sales floor with sales tags there-
on. When a sale was made thereafter, if for cash, remittance
was made to the [finance company], or if by conditional bill
of sale, that document was assigned. While we recognize that
the Federal courts above mentioned have taken the opposite
view, we are not disposed to follow them. It is our opinion that
the sound and just rule is the one for which the state courts of
last resort, above cited, have given their support.1
37
In all these cases it will have been observed that the basic idea was
the same: in each, a dealer was attempting to finance incoming stock
through the mediation of a financing agency. In this respect there
was a distinct resemblance to the typical import trust receipt transaction
already described. Despite this similarity in the underlying intention
of the parties, however, the finance company was allowed to prevail
over the dealer's receiver in Ivy v. Commercial Credit Company,38
while an opposite conclusion was reached in General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation v. Seattle Association of Credit Men.3 9 Not unnatural-
ly the result was to cast uncertainty on the effectiveness of any kind
of trust receipt in the state of Washington. Further analysis of the
cases is theref6re called for.
We already have noted that the -essence of the usual import trans-
action was the retention by the bank of . security interest already
acquired from the seller while the possession of the goods was entrust-
ed to the buyer for the purpose of realizing them by resale. This was
substantially the situation in Ivy v. Commercial Credit Company,4
although there was a complicating feature in the presence of the bill
of sale given by the seller to the finance company. Viewed literally,
this might be taken to indicate an outright sale, passing such complete
: Supra, note 26.
7' General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Seattle Association of
Credit Men, supra, note 33, pp. 288-292.
',
8 Supra, not& 26.39Supra, note 33.
4o Supra, note 26.
1941)
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property rights to the finance company that the subsequent transac-
tion between the finance company and the dealer would have all the
appearance of a conditional sale.41 Obviously, however, the finance com-
pany is not in the business of buying and selling cars; its function is
the provision of credit, and its interest in the automobiles is purely by
way of security for extensions granted. More properly, therefore, the
bill of sale should be construed as intended merely to pass a security
interest.4 2 The transaction was thus one along orthodox lines, and the
decision in the case recognizes the validity of a trust receipt used under
such conditions.
In General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Seattle Association of
Credit Men,43 on the other hand, still further complicating features
appear. Emphasized by the court was an absolute promise by the dealer
to pay the finance company, through the signing of a promissory note
covering the price of the cars. In itself this does not seem to introduce
a sufficient distinction to warrant a decision different from that in the
earlier case. As pointed out by Wilbur, Circ. J., in General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation v. Kline,
4 4
"the giving of such notes is analogous to the use of trade
acceptances in connection with the trust receipts commonly
used in the importation of merchandise, which constitute an
obligation of the dealer, and to the time drafts or acceptances
referred to in the opinion in In Re James, Inc."
45
Certainly, the ordinary import transaction, either through the terms
of the credit agreement or otherwise, provided for the reimbursement
of the bank by the importer; but the arrangement never was felt to
derogate in any way from the efficacy of the trust receipt. The promise
was not given to a seller for the price of goods, but to a lender for
the repayment of an advance. 41 In the present case, however, there was
another factor to be taken into consideration. The trust receipt itself
"This view of the matter was taken in General Motors Acceptance
Corporation v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928). See also
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Whitely, 217 Ia. 998, 252 N. W.
779 (1934).
' 
2 Thus Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction, supra, note 4, says at page
37: "The bank does not aim to make a seller's profit by transferring the
ownership to the buyer. It acts solely as a go-between by advancing the
purchase price to the real seller for the benefit of the real buyer. It is
not in the business of selling goods but in that of supplying funds." See
also Sullivan v. Lewis, 170 Wash. 413, 16 P. (2d) 834 (1932), where a bill
of sale absolute on its face was construed as a chattel mortgage in view
of the intention of the parties to pass only a security interest.
"s Supra, note 33.
4 Supra, note 29.
41 Id. at page 622.
'0 The fact that the dealer is indebted to the finance company and has
promised to pay merely emphasizes the security nature of the finance
company's interest in the goods; but it furnishes no indication at all
that such security interest has been acquired from the dealer rather than
from the original seller.
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provided expressly that the dealer was not to sell the cars until the
amount due was paid.47 Taken in conjunction with the promise to pay
at all events this provision afforded clear evidence of an intention quite
foreign to the accepted idea of a trust receipt transaction, for the
effect was to divorce payment from the proceeds of resale and thus to
destroy utterly the self-liquidating feature inherent in that idea.4s
Whatever the resulting situation might be, it obviously was something
very different from that disclosed by the record in Ivy v. Commercial
Credit Company,"9 and the so-called trust receipt was really not a
trust receipt at all. The court decided rightly that the finance company
should not be protected in its claim to the cars.
The two decided cases just discussed admittedly provide only a
slight basis for forecasting the probable future course of judicial opin-
ion in the state of Washington in regard to trust receipts. It neverthe-
less does not seem unfair to conclude that in a case involving the pro-
cedure of the orthodox trust receipt transaction, as taken over from im-
porting, the effectiveness of the trust receipt as an instrument sui generis
will be upheld; in a case, that is, where a financing agent acquires a
security interest in goods from the seller, and retains it while surren-
dering possession of the goods to the buyer for the purpose of resale in
order to provide the means of liquidating an advance. This was the
situation in Ivy v. Commercial Credit Company,50 and was not the
situation in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Seattle Asso-
ciation of Credit Men.51 The language of Main, J., in the latter case,
should not be understood as reflecting on the use of the trust recipt
in its proper sphere, but solely with reference to the factual set-up
that was before the court.
Although there is thus hope that trust receipts, within the limits
described, may find support from the Washington court, modern, com-
merce, as already noted, has found other uses for the instrument which
do not fall inside these limits. "Meantime the device, or something
called by the same name, has spread into many more phases of financ-
ing. From automobile financing it has spread to most other articles
sold to the consumer on the installment plan-radios, etc. Stockbrokers
taking collateral out in the morning, under agreement to return an
equivalent value before close of business, commonly sign 'trust re-
ceipts.' Central bankers who loan on collateral to other banks, when
they release the collateral notes as they mature and return them to
"See note 35.
48 It is noteworthy that Sec. 2 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act re-
stricts a trust receipt transaction to a situation in which the resale of the
goods entrusted is contemplated.
'9 Supra, note 26..
50 Supra, note 26.
51 Supra, note 33.
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the borrowing bank for collection or renewal, commonly do so against
their customer bank's 'trust receipt.' And so on. In a word, whenever
anyone who is not a consumer needs temporary possession of goods
or securities theretofore in the possession of a financier who holds a
security interest in them, the trust receipt or some instrument like it
is being used-and needs to be used."152 It well may be, from the point
of view of commercial convenience, that the use of the trust receipt
device in situations such as those enumerated is eminently desirable.
The fact remains, however, that these extensions into new fields in-
volve departures from the essential features of the orthodox trust re-
ceipt transaction. If such departures are worth taking, the query may
be raised whether provision for them should not be made through leg-
islation.5
3
To summarize the position: We have seen that the trust receipt per-
forms a useful function in facilitating the short term financing of a
dealer's incoming stock under circumstances that make it possible to
use the proceeds of the stock to pay off the indebtedness. We have
noted further that when so used, along the clear cut lines of the typical
importing transaction, the trust receipt is readily explainable as an in-
strument sui generis. The extension of the trust receipt device to vari-
ous sorts of domestic transactions has complicated the picture. In some
instances the essential features of the orthodox transaction have been
preserved; in others they have been lost, either wholly or in part. In
the former case, it is submitted that there should be no difficulty in
upholding the effectiveness of the instrument according to its terms. In
the latter, the real question is whether the use of the device is so com-
mercially desirable in the situations involved as to warrant the adop-
tion of legislation making it possible.
11 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1933) 246.
5" The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, recommended for adoption in 1933,
makes such provision. The Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1933) at page 249 states the general
theory of the Act as follows: "The Act accepts the desirability of pro-
tecting the new financing of a dealer's incoming stock (or the release
of security to a pledgor) while allowing possession to be in the dealer(or pledgor of securities) for legitimate purposes looking toward real-
ization or substitution of the security. This accords both with business
practice and business needs. The Act proceeds on the theory that the
entruster in such case is entitled to protection only against honest in-
solvency of the trustee. Dishonest action of the trustee is a credit risk,
and bona fide purchasers are to be protected against the entruster who
has taken that risk by entrusting." The Act has been adopted in ten
states. It has been well received by commentators, even the most friendly
of whom, however, have pointed to ambiguities and inconsistencies, and
to its complicated structure.
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